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Abstract
Product reviews are extremely valuable for online
shoppers in providing purchase decisions. Driven
by immense profit incentives, fraudsters deliberately
fabricate untruthful reviews to distort the reputation
of online products. As online reviews become more
and more important, group spamming, i.e., a team
of fraudsters working collaboratively to attack a set
of target products, becomes a new fashion. Previous
works use review network effects, i.e. the relation-
ships among reviewers, reviews, and products, to
detect fake reviews or review spammers, but ignore
time effects, which are critical in characterizing group
spamming. In this paper, we propose a novel Markov
random field (MRF)-based method (ColluEagle) to
detect collusive review spammers, as well as review
spam campaigns, considering both network effects
and time effects. First we identify co-review pairs,
a review phenomenon that happens between two
reviewers who review a common product in a similar
way, and then model reviewers and their co-review
pairs as a pairwise-MRF, and use loopy belief prop-
agation to evaluate the suspiciousness of reviewers.
We further design a high quality yet easy-to-compute
node prior for ColluEagle, through which the review
spammer groups can also be subsequently identified.
Experiments show that ColluEagle can not only
∗Corresponding author: zhuowang@sylu.edu.cn
detect collusive spammers with high precision,
significantly outperforming state-of-the-art baselines
— FraudEagle and SpEagle, but also identify highly
suspicious review spammer campaigns.
Keywords: Fake review detection, Review
spammer detection, Group spamming, Markov ran-
dom field, Loopy belief propagation
1 Introduction
Online product reviews are increasingly influencing
customers’ purchase decisions, and thereby influenc-
ing product sales. To promote or demote product
reputations, review spammers try to game the review
websites by posting untruthful review content and/or
rating stars. Ordinary customers have much diffi-
culties in distinguishing fake reviews from genuine
ones, as a result, are vulnerable to review spamming.
Nowadays, as the word-of-mouth marketing prevails,
group spamming, i.e., a group of review spammers
working together to promote or demote a set of tar-
get products, is becoming the new form of review
spamming.
Over the years, researchers proposed various tech-
niques to detect spam reviews, review spammers, or
spammer groups. However, the problem is far from
being solved because the underlying mechanism of
review spamming is still unclear. Previous research
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focus on review content [4, 10, 6], review behavior
[7, 9], and the relationships among reviewers, reviews
and products [14, 8, 16]. These methods are shown
to be effective in spotting certain kinds of spamming
activities. Nonetheless, there is no one-size-fits-all so-
lutions to detect all kinds of review spamming, due
to the ever-changing spam strategies and the emerg-
ing review domains, etc. Therefore, it seems that the
best way for detecting review spam is to incorporate
as many approaches as possible.
Since it is hard to classify a review/reviewer as
fake/real, ranking-based methods are often used
to rank reviews/reviewers according to their suspi-
ciousness in committing spam [7, 14, 1, 12]. Re-
cently, Markov random field (MRF)-based methods,
FraudEagle [1] and SpEagle [12], are shown to be su-
perior to other ranking methods. FraudEagle is a
light-weight detection method, which models the re-
viewer - product bipartite network with signed edges
as a MRF. To facilitate generality, FraudEagle does
not use review content information and any prior
knowledge of nodes. SpEagle builds on FraudEagle
framework and extends it in two main directions: (1)
Extending the graph representation to the reviewer -
review - product tripartite network, and (2) incorpo-
rating review/reviewer/product priors into the MRF
network. It turns out that SpEagle is much more
accurate than FraudEagle in detecting spam reviews
and review spammers, although it takes considerable
more efforts and time to compute reviewer priors, re-
view priors, and product priors.
While FraudEagle and SpEagle both exploit review
network effects to detect suspicious review/reviewers,
they ignore time effects, which play a critical role in
characterizing group spamming. Another drawback
of these two methods is that they only rank individual
review spammers, but are not able to detect review
spammer groups. In this paper, considering both re-
view network effects and time effects, we propose a
novel MRF-based model that can detect both collu-
sive review spammers and review spam campaigns in
which they are involved. We identify that such collu-
sive activities can be attributed to co-review pairs, a
review phenomenon between two reviewers who write
fake reviews towards a common product in a collusive
way — rating similar scores within a short period of
time. We then model the co-reviewing behavior into
a pairwise-MRF, with nodes representing reviewers
and edges representing the co-review relationships.
The contributions of our work are three-fold:
• We propose ColluEagle (resembling FraudEa-
gle and SpEagle), a novel pairwise-MRF model
which elegantly embeds the co-review phe-
nomenon. We design a loopy belief propagation-
based algorithm to infer the likely-hood of a re-
viewer being involved in group spamming.
• We design for ColluEagle a computationally ef-
ficient reviewer prior, namely Neighbor tight-
ness (NT ), which can significantly boost the
performance of ColluEagle. Meanwhile, the re-
view spam campaigns are simultaneously identi-
fied and ranked through the spam scores of the
individual campaign members evaluated by the
MRF-model.
• We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate
the performance of ColluEagle. Experiments
show that ColluEagle not only detects collu-
sive reviewer spammers with significantly higher
performance than FraudEagle and SpEagle, but
also detects highly suspicious review spammer
groups.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses the related work. In Section 3, we
first describe the pairwise-MRF model and its infer-
ence method, then we give the method to compute
prior NT and identify review spammer groups using
the spamicity of individual group memebers. Sec-
tion 4 gives the experimental results. We conclude
our work in Section 5.
2 Related work
Jindal and Liu first proposed the fake review detec-
tion problem [4]. The problem can be further cat-
egorized into fake review detection [4, 10, 18, 22],
fake reviewer detection [7, 14, 20], and review spam-
mer group detection [8, 22, 17, 16, 15]. There are
also many survey papers [2, 11, 13] summarizing the
abundant works in this research field.
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Figure 1: SpEagle graph representation
In recent years, detecting collusive review spam-
mers or review spam campaigns is becoming a new
trend. The first work aiming to detect review spam-
mer groups is by Mukherjee et al. who use Frequent
Item Set (FIM) mining to generate candidate re-
viewer groups, and design a PageRank-like algorithm
(GSRank) to compute the spamicity of a reviewer
group [8]. Xu et al. proposed a statistical model
LCM (for Latent Collusion Model) and use EM al-
gorithm to infer the collusion from the given FIM
candidate colluder groups [19]. These works rely on
FIM to generate candidate suspicious reviewer groups
or individual suspicious reviewers. FIM, however, is
not capable of finding small reviewer groups (e.g., a
group of review spammers only targeting one prod-
uct) or loosely connected reviewer groups [17].
The most closely related works to ours are
FraudEagle and SpEagle, which exploit MRF to rank
review spammers and fake reviews. FraudEagle mod-
els reviewers and products as MRF nodes, and the
rating relations between reviewers and products as
MRF edges. The edges are signed with“+” or “-”
representing a reviewer writing a positive or negative
review for a product, which corresponds to different
edge potentials in a pairwise-MRF. SpEagle extends
from FraudEagle by also regarding the reviews as a
type of nodes as shown in Fig. 1, with the reviewer
- review edge defined as “write”, and the review -
product edge defined as “belong to”. Therefore, the
compatibility (edge) potentials are designed to reflect
the fact that all the reviews written by a spammer
(benign users) are all fake (genuine), and the major-
ity of the reviews for targeted (non-targeted) prod-
ucts are fake (genuine). Although these assumptions
make sense for fake reviews and review spammers in
review data, both FraudEagle and SpEagle fail to re-
veal the collusion nature of group review spammers.
So in our work, we introduce co-review pairs into
our MRF model to capture collusive review spam-
mers, which is notably different from FraudEagle and
SpEagle. Moreover, FraudEagle and SpEagle them-
selves do not identify review spammer groups. To
detect groups, further steps (e.g., clustering) are ex-
ploited upon the top-ranked reviewers, e.g., FraudEa-
gle exploits the top ranked reviewers to obtain an in-
duced subgraph of users and products, and the cross-
associations clustering algorithm were used to detect
bipartite cores. In contrast, our proposed ColluEa-
gle detects individual review spammers and spammer
groups in a holistic manner, and detects the review
spammer groups over the whole review dataset.
There are also other group spamming detection
works using MRF. For instance, Fei et al. first use
kernel density estimation to detect review bursts in
product reviews, and then use MRF and LBP to iden-
tify if a review burst is a normal burst (e.g., by TV
commercial) or is under a spam attack [3]. They
treat all the reviewers in a burst as a fully-connected
graph (clique), and each reviewer can be in one of the
three hidden states: non-spammer, mixed, and spam-
mer. Although both use MRFs, ColluEagle does not
rely on review bursts, and the underlying topolog-
ical structures of the two MRF graphs are notably
different. Li et al. also use MRF to model the re-
lationships among twitter users, the URLs in tweets,
and the burstiness of tweets [5]. Therefore, a typed-
MRF model is designed to detect Twitter campaign
promoters. In their work, however, Twitter campaign
promoters do not have to be twitter spammers. More-
over, their MRF model has three types of nodes and
the edge semantics do not conform to those in review
data environment.
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Figure 2: A co-review pair and the collusiveness be-
tween two reviewers
3 Methodology
In this section, we first describe ColluEagle model
and its LBP inference algorithm, then we discuss how
to use node priors to boost the performance of Col-
luEagle, along with the method exploited to detect
review spammer groups.
3.1 Co-review pairs
Previous studies reveal that there are a large num-
ber of review spammers when a product suddenly
receives a review burst [3, 15]. Such review bursts
often involve group review spamming campaigns, for
which there exist a group of review spammers work-
ing collaboratively to promote or demote a set of tar-
get products. To describe group spamming, we for-
mulate this collective opinion spamming activity as a
co-review behavior between two reviewers who write
similar reviews towards one or more target products.
Fig. 2 illustrates a co-review pair for which reviewer ri
and reviewer rj co-review a target product pk, along
with their corresponding reviews vik and vjk. The
consistency of a co-review pair can be measured by
the similarity between review vik and vjk, which usu-
ally consist of the review content and the meta-data
such as review timestamps tik and tjk, and rating
stars ψik and ψjk for reviewer ri and rj , respectively.
There shall be various methods to quantify the con-
sistency of a co-review pair, here we give a measure
of co-review similarity from a probabilistic point of
view. As reported by many researchers [10, 9, 12], re-
view content (text) is unreliable in judging the truth-
fulness of a review, thus we only consider review
meta-data (review date and rating stars).
Definition 1 Co-review similarity: Given two re-
viewers ri and rj who co-review a product pk with
their reviews vik and vjk, assume ∆t = tik − tjk,
∆ψ = ψik − ψjk both follow a normal distribution,
and ∆t ∼ N(0, σ21), ∆ψ ∼ N(0, σ
2
2), we define the
co-review similarity of vik and vjk towards pk as:
σ(vik , vjk, pk) = 4 Φ(−
|∆t|
σ1
) Φ(−
|∆ψ|
σ2
) (1)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) of the standard normal distribution.
The intuition of Definition 1 is illustrated as fol-
low. We assume random variable ∆t and ∆ψ follow
normal distributions with parameters N(0, σ21) and
N(0, σ22), respectively. Assuming ∆t and ∆ψ are in-
dependent, we use the joint probability of ∆t and
∆ψ, p(∆t,∆ψ) = p(∆t)p(∆ψ), to represent the sim-
ilarity of the co-review pair. It is easy to see that
the co-review similarity gets larger as their review
time interval gets shorter and their rating stars get
closer. Note that parameter σ1 and σ2 can be esti-
mated from review data. Because each Φ(·) in Eqn.
1 is in (0, 0.5], σ(vik , vjk, pk) ∈ (0, 1].
Since two reviewers ri and rj might commonly re-
view multiple target products, we then define the col-
lusiveness between ri and rj by considering multiple
co-review pairs, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
Definition 2 Collusiveness between two reviewers:
Given two reviewers ri and rj, let Pi denote the prod-
uct set reviewed by ri, we define the collusiveness be-
tween ri and rj as:
collu(ri, rj) = max
pk∈Pi∩Pj
σ(vik, vjk, pk) (2)
3.2 The ColluEagle model
To compute the spamicity of each reviewer in a re-
viewer - review - product tripartite network shown in
Fig. 1, we first construct a reviewer - reviewer graph
as defined in Definition 3.
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Definition 3 Reviewer graph: Let R =
{r1, r2, . . . , rN} be a set of N reviewers. By
computing the collusiveness of each reviewer -
reviewer pair using Equation 2, we can construct
a reviewer graph G = (V,E), where V = R, and
E = {(ri, rj)|collu(ri, rj) ≥ δ, ri, rj ∈ R}, where δ is
a threshold controlling the density of graph G.
In summary, reviewer graph G not only captures
the network effect of the reviewer - product bipartite
graph, but also captures the time effect that collu-
sive reviewers often co-review a common product in
a narrow time window. This paves the way for us to
identify suspicious reviewers from the huge amount of
review data by using a Markov random field (MRF)
model.
MRF is often used to model a set of random vari-
ables having a Markov property described by an undi-
rected graph. In particular, a pairwise-MRF is a
MRF satisfying the pairwise Markov property, i.e.,
a random variable is assumed to be dependent only
on its neighbors and independent of all other vari-
ables. We then model G as a pairwise-MRF by asso-
ciating each node (reviewer) with a random variable
Xi, i = 1, . . . , N , where Xi corresponds to ri ∈ R.
Let L = {+1,−1} denotes a set of labels, where +1
denote benign and −1 denotes spammer, and xi ∈ L
denotes the label of node (or the value of random
variable) Xi. As such, the review spammer detec-
tion problem can be formulated to a classification
problem using a MRF based on reviewer graph G,
i.e., inferring the class labels of all latent variables
X = {X1, X2, . . . , XN} given the observed reviewer
graph G and a set of spamicity priors for reviewers
in R.
To build a complete pairwise-MRF model, we shall
specify the node potentials of the class labels of node
Xi, denoted as ψ(xi), and the edge potentials (or
compatibility potentials) for all combinations of the
labels of two adjacent nodes Xi and Xj , denoted as
ψ(xi, xj). In this formulation, we define node poten-
tials as the probabilities of a reviewer being a benign
or spammer, i.e., ψ(xi) = p(xi). In MRF we can sim-
ply give ψ(xi) a fixed value, e.g., (0.8, 0.2) for labels
{+1,−1}, or a prior derived from some features ex-
tracted from review data (see Section 3.4). Moreover,
we define the edge potential between two adjacent
nodes with labels xi and xj as
ψ(xi, xj) = e
xixjcollu(ri,rj) (3)
Equation 3 implies that the probability a benign node
having a benign neighbor, or a spammer node hav-
ing a spammer neighbor is much larger than a benign
node having a spammer neighbor, or a spammer node
having a benign neighbor. Therefore, the joint prob-
ability of a configuration of the labels of all the nodes
in a MRF can be written as:
p(X) =
1
Z
∏
Xi∈V
ψ(xi)
∏
(Xi,Xj)∈E
ψ(xi, xj) (4)
where Z is the normalization constant. However,
p(X) is computationally intractable for large scale
reviewer graphs, thus we resort to approximate infer-
ence methods to compute the suspiciousness of each
reviewer in G.
3.3 Model inference
To infer the node labels in reviewer graph G, we use
loopy belief propagation (LBP), a widely adopted
approximate inference algorithm for MRF. In LBP,
a node iteratively sends messages to its neighbor
nodes until all the messages become stationary. Let
mi→j(xj) denote the message of label xj passed from
node Xi to node Xj , the message passing formula is:
mi→j(xj) =
1
Z1
∑
xi∈L
ψ(xi)ψ(xi, xj)
∏
Xk∈Ni\Xj
mk→i(xi)
(5)
where Ni denotes the set of neighbor nodes ofXi, and
Z1 is the normalization constant. Equation 5 means
that the message (benign or spammer) passed from
node i to node j is proportional to the sum, over each
xi ∈ L, of the product of the node potential of node
i, the compatibility potential between xi and xj , and
all the messages passed from the neighbors of node
i except for node j to node i. The above message
update equation is called the Sum-product LBP.
In the initial phase of LBP, all the messages are set
to 1. Then LBP iteratively updates each node using
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Equation 5. When LBP converges, the final belief
that a node Xi having label xi can be computed by:
bi(xi) =
1
Z2
ψ(xi)
∏
Xk∈Ni
mk→i(xi) (6)
where Z2 is the normalization constant.
3.4 Using priors
From Equation 5 and 6 we can see that node priors
in ColluEagle play a important role in ranking review
spammers, which is also a main beauty of SpEagle.
The difference in using priors is that SpEagle has
three kinds of nodes — reviewer nodes, review nodes,
and product nodes, while ColluEagle only consists
of reviewer nodes. In this subsection, we consider
two reviewer priors — prior ALL and prior NT , for
ColluEagle.
3.4.1 Prior ALL
SpEagle takes into account three kinds of features
— reviewer-based features, product-based features,
and review-based features, each of which is further
categorized into textual features and behavioral fea-
tures. As reported in [12], the most effective features
are the review-based features, and the product-based
features have almost no effect in SpEagle. Table 1
lists the review-based behavioral features.
To serve as the priors of each kind of nodes, in
SpEagle, features of the same kind are preprocessed
with the following two steps:
• Step 1: Normalize. To unify the features for the
particular nodes into a comparable scale and in-
terpretation, the empirical cumulative distribu-
tion function (CDF) is used whatever a high or
low feature value is more suspicious. Specifically,
for each feature l, 1 ≤ l ≤ F , where F is the to-
tal number of features for that kind of nodes,
and the corresponding value of node i, denoted
by xli, we compute
f(xli) =
{
1− P (Xl ≤ xli), if high is suspicious
P (Xl ≤ xli), otherwise
where Xl denotes a real-valued random variable
associated with feature l that follows probability
distribution P . As a result, the lower the value of
f(xli), the more suspicious the node gets, what-
ever high or low the original feature values are.
• Step 2: Combine. Given F features of node i, the
spam score of node i is computed by combining
all the normalized feature values of node i, i.e.,
Si = 1−
√∑F
l=1 f(xli)
2
F
(7)
Based on the above two steps, we compute the prior
for each review, namely prior ALL, by combining the
six review-based features in Table 1. We do not use
textual features because it is reported that textual
features are computationally inefficient and perform
poor in distinguishing review spam from truthful re-
view [12, 20]. Our experimental study shows that
this is a high quality prior for identifying both fake
reviews and review spammers in Yelp datasets.
Since ColluEagle only has reviewer nodes, a
straightforward scheme is to use the reviewer-based
features to devise the reviewer node priors. However,
as observed in SpEagle, reviewer-based features are
not as effective as review-based features, at least in
Yelp datasets. An alternative scheme is to transform
review-based features to reviewer-based features by
assuming that if a review is fake, then the author of
the review is also a spammer. As such, for a reviewer
ri, we choose to set the prior of ri to the maximum
prior of all the reviews written by reviewer ri:
prior(ri) = max
vik∈Vri
prior(vik) (8)
where Vri denotes the review set of ri. Our exper-
iments show that this scheme can significantly im-
prove detection precision in comparison to the scheme
using the reviewer-based features proposed in SpEa-
gle.
3.4.2 Prior NT
Since prior ALL is expensive to compute, and do-
main knowledge-related, we resort to design an easy-
to-compute and domain-independent node prior for
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Table 1: Review-based behavioral features used in [12]
Abbr. description
Rank Rank order among all the reviews of product
RD Absolute rating deviation from product’s average
rating
EXT Extremity of rating, 1 for {5,4}, 0 for {1,2,3}
DEV Thresholded rating deviation of a review
ETF Early time frame, spammers often review early
ISR Is singleton review?
ColluEagle by exploiting the topological structure of
the review network that reflects the collusive behavior
of review spammers. First we introduce the definition
of a companion reviewer graph.
Definition 4 Companion reviewer graph: Let R =
{r1, r2, . . . , rN} be a set of N reviewers. By com-
puting the collusiveness of each reviewer - reviewer
pair using Equation 2, we can construct a compan-
ion reviewer graph G∗ = (V,E∗), where V = R, and
E∗ = {(ri, rj)|collu(ri, rj)
|Pi∩Pj |
|Pi∪Pj |
≥ δ′, ri, rj ∈ R},
where δ′ is a threshold controlling the density of graph
G∗.
The difference between a reviewer graph G and its
companion reviewer graph G∗ is that the edge weight
between node ri and node rj is multiplied by the Jac-
card similarity of reviewer ri and rj in G
∗, thus the
companion graph is much sparser than its original re-
viewer graph for δ = δ′. Note that δ′ in a companion
reviewer graph is not necessary to be equal to δ in
its original reviewer graph. The Jaccard co-efficient
restricts the two reviewers to review more products
in common, and at the same time, review less prod-
ucts that are not in common, which indicates a collu-
sive review behavior between the two reviewers. It is
easy to see that this companion graph can be conve-
niently computed at the same time when computing
the original reviewer graph. However, the compan-
ion reviewer graph does not work well for LBP due
to its sparsity, but it facilitates LBP in designing a
high quality reviewer prior.
Once the companion reviewer graph is computed,
we can use SCAN [21] to mine all the dense clusters
in it. These dense clusters, which characterize group
spamming, are highly suspicious thus are supposed
to be the candidate review spammer groups. We first
compute the Neighbor tightness (NT ) of a group g,
and then we take this NT value as the prior of the
spamicity of each reviewer in that group.
NT (g) =
∑
ri,rj∈g
collu(ri, rj)
|Pi∩Pj |
|Pi∪Pj |(
|g|
2
) 1
1 + e−(|g|−2)
(9)
where |g| denotes the number of reviewers in group g.
The last term is a sigmoid function which penalizes
small groups.
3.5 Ranking review spammer groups
Recall that when computing prior NT , we use SCAN
to generate candidate collusive spammer groups. The
spamicity of these groups can be measured by the
prior NT of that group. However, the spamicity of
these groups can be further evaluated by the average
spamicity of the group members computed by LBP
using prior NT (or other priors). We call this spam-
icity the posterior of a candidate group. The interest-
ing point here is that the candidate groups facilitate
LBP by providing NT prior, and conversely, LBP
facilitates candidate groups by providing the spam
scores of the group members. Thus our method can
detect both individual review spammers and review
spammer groups, in a holistic fashion.
3.6 The ColluEagle algorithm
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Algorithm 1 ColluEagle
Input:
D: Review metadata (reviewer id, product id, date, rating score);
δ: a threshold for generating the reviewer graph;
δ′: a threshold for generating the companion reviewer graph;
σ1, σ2: parameters used in co-review similarity computation;
FS: a foreign spam prior vector for reviewers, e.g., prior ALL
Output:
Ranked individual reviewers and review spammer groups
Description:
1: Construct reviewer graph G = (V, E) using D and δ, as well as the companion reviewer graph G∗ using δ′;
2: Use SCAN on G∗ to find candidate review spammer groups;
3: Compute group spam indicator NT for each candidate group g, i.e., spam(g) = NT ;
4: Set the spam prior of reviewer ri, denoted as Si, to spam(g), ri ∈ g;
5: for each node Xi ∈ V do
6: if Foreign prior is used then
7: ψ(xi) = (1− FSi, FSi);
8: else
9: ψ(xi) = (1− Si, Si);
10: end if
11: end for
12: for each edge e = (Xi, Xj) ∈ E do
13: for xi, xj ∈ L do
14: mi→j(xj) = 1; mj→i(xi) = 1;
15: end for
16: end for
17: for each connected component C = (Vc, Ec) in G do
18: repeat
19: for each node Xi ∈ Vc do
20: for each node Xj ∈ Ni do
21: for xj ∈ L do
22: update mi→j(xj) using Equation 5;
23: end for
24: end for
25: end for
26: until all messages stop changing;
27: for each node Xi ∈ Vc and Xi has neighbors do
28: for xi ∈ L do
29: Compute belief bi(xi) using Equation 6;
30: end for
31: end for
32: end for
33: return ranked reviewers based on belief bi(xi = −1), and ranked review spammer groups based on the average belief of
the group members;
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In a nutshell, we illustrate ColluEagle in Algorithm
1. It takes as input the review metadata, the afore-
mentioned parameters, and a foreign spam prior vec-
tor (FS) if any. As output, it ranks reviewers accord-
ing to their spam scores, and review spammer groups
based on their average spam scores of the group mem-
bers.
Line 1 constructs the reviewer graph G based on
Equation 2 with the specified graph pruning param-
eter δ, and simultaneously compute the companion
reviewer graph G∗ using δ′. Line 2-4 first find candi-
date review spammer groups using SCAN from G∗,
and compute the NT prior for each group, and then
these NT priors are converted to the reviewer spam
priors. Line 5-11 set the node priors in MRF as NT ,
or a foreign prior in FS, if any. Line 12-16 perform
initialization of the messages for the labels on both
directions of the edge in G (set to 1). Line 17-32
traverse each connected component in G to compute
the spamicity of each reviewer in that component,
which greatly facilitates the parallelization of LBP.
For each connected components in G, Line 18-26 iter-
atively send messages from a node to one of its neigh-
bors using Equation 5, until all the messages stabilize,
i.e., converged. Line 27-31 compute the beliefs of the
two class labels for all the nodes using Equation 6.
Note that we ignore the isolated nodes who have no
neighbors, because they do not participate in LBP.
Finally, Line 33 returns the spam scores of review-
ers, which correspond to the belief a reviewer being
a spammer, and also the candidate review spammer
groups are ranked based on the average belief of the
group members.
Here we use a method similar to Algorithm
ConstructReviewerGraph proposed in [16] to con-
struct the reviewer graph, for which the time com-
plexity is O(e), where e is the number of edges in the
reviewer-product bipartite graph. From Algorithm 1
we can see that the time complexity of ColluEagle is
proportional to the number of edges in graph G, and
the number of iterations k. That is, T (n) = O(k|E|),
where n = |R|, E is the set of edges in G. Fortu-
nately, both k and |E| can be lowered by setting a
maximum number of iterations and/or specifying a
larger δ.
4 Experimental study
4.1 Datasets and compared baselines
To evaluate the performance of ColluEagle, we use
two labeled datasets, YelpNYC and YelpZip, crawled
by Rayana et al. [12], containing reviews for restau-
rants from Oct 2004 to Jan 2015. Table 2 illustrates
the datasets we used. In each dataset, each review
is labeled as either fake or genuine, according to the
fake review filtering algorithm of Yelp.com [12]. Since
the datasets do not label reviewers, we label a re-
viewer as spammer if and only if there exists at least
one review written by that reviewer that is fake. Oth-
erwise, the reviewer is labeled as benign, which is also
the same way used in [12].
Table 2: Review dataset statistics
Dataset #Reviews #Reviewers #Products
YelpNYC 359,052 160,225 923
YelpZip 608,598 260,277 5,044
The most related works to ColluEagle are
FraudEagle and SpEagle, which also rank reviewers
and reviews by spam scores. Our proposed ColluEa-
gle only contains reviewer nodes, thus it is best to
use it to rank reviewers. To evaluate the performance
of review spammer groups ranked by ColluEagle, we
compare ColluEagle with our recent work for reviewer
spammer group ranking, namely GSLDA [15], which
was shown to be superior to other group spammer
detection methods.
4.2 Performance for ranking individ-
ual reviewers
First, we evaluate the performance of ColluEagle,
FraudEagle and SpEagle on dataset YelpNYC and
YelpZip for ranking individual reviewers. For Col-
luEagle we set σ1 = 90, σ2 = 3 for both datasets, and
use prior ALL or prior NT as the node priors, respec-
tively. We vary δ and δ′ to generate various ranking
lists of ColluEagle. For FraudEagle, we set the priors
of reviewer nodes and product nodes to (0.5, 0.5) as
the way done in FraudEagle. For SpEagle, we use the
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Figure 3: Reviewer ranking comparison for
ColluEagle, SpEagle, FraudEagle, and priors.
ColluEagle+NT(δ = 0.6) denotes ColluEagle using
prior NT and δ = 0.6, ColluEagle+ALL(δ = 0.8)
denotes ColluEagle using prior ALL and δ = 0.8.
SpEagle(R) denotes ranking reviewers according to
reviewer nodes in SpEagle, and SpEagle(V) ranking
reviewers according to review nodes in SpEagle. Here
we set δ′ = 0.5.
SpLite version which is computationally efficient and
yields a similar performance to SpEagle. That is, we
use prior ALL as the review node priors, and set the
priors of reviewer nodes and product nodes as (0.5,
0.5).
Since SpEagle has both reviewer nodes and review
nodes, we can rank reviewers either from the reviewer
node beliefs (denoted as SpEagle(R)) or from the re-
view node beliefs (denoted as SpEagle(V)), assuming
that a reviewer is a spammer if and only if he/she
has written at least one fake review.
Since ColluEagle, SpEagle, and FraudEagle are all
ranking-based approaches, we use NDCG@k to eval-
uate the top-ranked reviewers. NDCG (normalized
discounted cumulative gain) is a metric to inspect the
quality (precision) at the top of a ranking list, which
is widely used in outlier/spam/fraud detection [12].
At this point, we consider two versions of ColluEa-
gle: ColluEagle+ALL (δ = 0.8), and ColluEalge+NT
(δ = 0.6). We set δ′ = 0.5 for both YelpNYC and
YelpZip to generate the companion reviewer graph
G∗.
For YelpNYC and YelpZip dataset, Fig. 3 shows
the NDCG@k comparison of the ranking results of
ColluEagle, SpEagle, FraudEagle, prior ALL and
prior NT , each considering the top-ranked 2000 re-
viewers. We can see that, in general, ColluEagle
significantly outperforms FraudEagle and SpEagle,
especially for YelpZip dataset, indicating the dis-
tinct advantage of co-review pair-based method in de-
tecting review spammers. As expected, FraudEagle
yields the worst performance, for it does not lever-
age any prior knowledge of any node. In general,
SpEagle(V) performs better than SpEagle(R), which
reveals that review nodes play a more important role
than reviewer nodes, probably because only the re-
view priors are used. We also rank reviewers accord-
ing to prior ALL or prior NT . From Fig. 3 we can see
that the two priors perform quite different for Yelp-
NYC and YelpZip dataset, and sometimes even beat
SpEagle, but none of them can exceed ColluEagle for
both datasets.
As we can see, parameter δ has much impact on
the performance of ColluEagle by influencing the un-
derlying graph topology in MRF. Therefore we run
ColluEagle+NT with different δ, and keep δ′ = 0.5,
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Figure 4: The impact of parameter δ in ColluEagle
(δ′ = 0.5)
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Figure 5: The impact of parameter δ′ in ColluEagle
(δ = 0.6)
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as shown in Fig. 4. We can see that the performance
for different δs are quite similar, indicating that Col-
luEagle is robust to δ. In general, smaller δ yields
better precision. This is because smaller δ produces
more edges in the reviewer graph, which play a impor-
tant role in LBP. Yet a small δ yields a large amount
of edges, which slows down LBP.
Also we can see that δ′ can impact the performance
of ColluEagle by providing different prior NT s. To
study the impact of δ′, we run ColluEagle+NT (δ =
0.6) for different δ′, as shown in Fig. 5. Again we can
see that the performance does not change much as
δ′ varies from 0.5 to 0.8, and a smaller δ′ would be
preferred. Experiments show that parameter σ1 and
σ2 only slightly impact the detection precision, so we
omit these results.
As review spam varies from one to another in char-
acteristics and strategies, different approaches might
good at detecting different kinds of review spam.
Therefore, we compared the ranking lists of ColluEa-
gle, SpEagle, and FraudEagle. To measure the sim-
ilarity between two ranking lists, we introduce two
metrics called overlapping degree and similarity de-
gree.
Definition 5 Overlapping degree@k: given two
ranking lists A and B, each consisting of k review-
ers, the overlapping degree of A and B is defined as:
O(A,B) =
|A ∩B|
k
(10)
Definition 6 Similarity degree@k: given two rank-
ing lists A and B, each consisting of k reviewers, let
a ∈ A, locA(a) denotes the position of a in A (start
from 1), we define the distance from a to B as:
dist(a,B) =
{
|locA(a)− locB(a)|, if a ∈ B
k, otherwise
Then we define the similarity degree of A and B as:
S(A,B) = 1−
∑
a∈A dist(a,B)
k2
(11)
Clearly, O(A,B) = O(B,A), S(A,B) =
S(B,A). We plot the overlapping and similar-
ity degree@2000 among ColluEagle+NT(δ = 0.6),
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Figure 6: Ranking list overlapping and similar-
ity degree comparison among ColluEagle+NT(δ =
0.6), ColluEagle+ALL(δ = 0.8), SpEagle(V), and
FraudEagle
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Table 3: Top 2000 Ranking lists comparison of
ColluEagle+NT(δ′ = 0.5) for different δ using
YelpZip. Overlapping degree in upper-triangle, and
Similarity degree in lower-triangle.
δ 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.6 0.8375 0.7460 0.7245
0.7 0.7826 0.8660 0.7595
0.8 0.6720 0.8046 0.8400
0.9 0.6440 0.6772 0.7694
Table 4: Top 2000 ranking lists comparison of
ColluEagle+NT(δ = 0.6) for different δ′ using
YelpZip. Overlapping degree in upper-triangle, and
Similarity degree in lower-triangle.
δ′ 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.5 0.7790 0.6640 0.5910
0.6 0.7300 0.7695 0.6695
0.7 0.5941 0.7222 0.7340
0.8 0.4883 0.5788 0.6667
CollEagle+ALL(δ = 0.8), SpEagle(V) and FraudEa-
gle, as shown in Fig. 6. We can see that the overlap-
ping and similarity degree between any two different
methods are all very low. Even for the same algo-
rithm, ColluEagle, with different priors (ALL and
NT ), the similarity degree is below 0.3 for YelpNYC
dataset,and 0.2 for YelpZip dataset. We also com-
pared the overlapping and similarity degree between
two ranking lists (top 2000 reviewers) of ColluEa-
gle+NT with different δ (fixing δ′ = 0.5), as shown
in Table 3, and two ranking lists of ColluEagle+NT
with different δ′ (fixing δ = 0.6), as shown in Table 4,
for YelpZip dataset. We can see that the overlapping
and similarity degree decrease as the difference of δ or
δ′ increases. The overlapping degree ranges from 59%
to 87%. This implies that these algorithms are good
at detecting different kinds of review spammers, thus
we can use different algorithms (ColluEagle, SpEa-
gle), different priors (e.g., prior ALL or NT ), or even
different δ and δ′ to detect more review spammers all
with a high precision, which can greatly improve the
detection recall.
4.3 Performance for ranking review
spammer groups
Now we consider the performance of ranking re-
view spammer groups detected by ColluEagle.
Here we compare with GSLDA [15], a LDA-based
method to detect review spammer groups. We use
ColluEagle+NT(δ = 0.6) to rank candidate review
spammer groups by the average belief of all the mem-
bers of that group. We tune the parameters in
GSLDA so that the best performance is achieved. We
fetch 2000 suspicious reviewers from the top ranked
groups generated by ColluEagle using prior NT , δ =
0.6, δ′ = 0.5 (denoted as ColluEagle+NT+Group)
and GSLDA.
Fig. 7(a) and (b) shows the detect precision of Col-
luEagle+NT+Group and GSLDA on YelpNYC and
YelpZip, respectively. To measure the promotion of
LBP in ColluEagle, we also plot the precision of the
prior NT and ColluEagle+NT(δ = 0.6) for the top
ranked 2000 reviewers. We can see that, for Yelp-
NYC, GSLDA outperforms ColluEagle+NT+Group
for approximately the top 900 reviewers, but after
that, ColluEagle+NT+Group outperforms GSLDA.
ColluEagle+NT(δ = 0.6) always outperforms
GSLDA. For YelpZip, we can see that both Col-
luEagle+NT+Group and ColluEagle+NT(δ = 0.6)
outperform GSLDA by a large margin. To our sur-
prise, ColluEagle+NT+Group achieves significantly
higher precision than ColluEagle+NT(δ = 0.6) for
top 500 reviewers. We also can see that prior NT is
the overall looser, and significantly lower than Col-
luEagle+NT+Group, indicating that LBP can sig-
nificantly improve the ranking quality of candidate
review group spammers.
Previous reviewer spammer group detection meth-
ods, e.g. GSRank, GSLDA, etc., require computing
several group spamming indicators or group mem-
ber spamming indicators, which is computationally
expensive and domain-related. In comparison, Col-
luEagle does not require computing any extra spam
indicators, and can detect review spammers and
groups in a holistic manner with a higher precision.
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Figure 7: Group ranking comparison on two datasets.
For ColluEagle+NT+Group and GSLDA, a marker
diamond or ’x’ is plotted every 40 groups. For
ColluEagle+NT(δ = 0.6) or prior NT , a marker is
plotted every 100 reviewers.
5 Conclusion
Detecting fake reviews or fake review spammers is
a challenging problem and has attracted enormous
research interest in recent years. In this paper, we
propose ColluEagle, a Markov random field-based de-
tection method, to detect collusive review spammers,
along with review spammer groups, by exploiting the
co-review behavior. The method is completely un-
supervised, time-efficient, and can detect different
kinds of spamming behaviors under the guidance of
prior knowledge extracted from review data. Exper-
imental study shows that ColluEagle can dramati-
cally improve the detection precision, outperforming
state-of-the-art baselines (FraudEagle, SpEagle, and
GSLDA) by a large margin, e.g., the NDCG@1000
metric for ColluEagle is improved about 20% com-
pared to SpEagle on YelpZip dataset. Future work
include seeking new robust node priors, new effective
co-review similarity metrics. A promising direction
is to detect fake reviews in an online fashion, i.e., de-
tecting emerging reputation fraud campaigns using
MRF-based models. For reproducibility, we share our
codes on Github1.
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